L’éditorial ou l’élégance du verbe en péril. 

              Par

Jamel

BENJEMIA                               

Il fut un temps, pas si lointain, où l’éditorial incarnait le sommet de la presse écrite. À travers lui, une rédaction exprimait non seulement une opinion, mais une vision du monde, tissée de mémoire, d’intuition, d’analyse et de souffle. L’éditorial, au-delà d’un genre, était un art : un exercice de style autant qu’un acte de pensée. Il s’y disait le présent, avec cette gravité tranquille et ce sens du phrasé qui font que certaines expressions traversent les décennies comme des balises dans la brume.

Cet art, mon père le vénérait. Il ne jurait que par trois plumes, trois consciences, trois voix, trois mondes. Jean Daniel, fondateur du Nouvel Observateur, maître du verbe et de la nuance. Bruno Frappat, longtemps plume du journal La Croix mais surtout grand nom du journal Le Monde, où il fut à la fois journaliste, éditorialiste et directeur. Et enfin Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, l’incontournable rédacteur en chef égyptien du journal Al Ahram (les Pyramides), conseiller de Nasser, dont la profondeur d’analyse et l’élégance d’écriture faisaient autorité dans toute la presse arabe. À ses yeux, il n’existait pas d’équivalents. Ces noms constituaient son panthéon personnel, et leur lecture était pour lui un rendez-vous sacré avec l’intelligence.

L'effondrement du style

Il serait sans doute atterré aujourd’hui, face à ce naufrage discret du style éditorial. Non pas que l’opinion ait disparu, elle est partout, trop peut-être, mais une opinion sans forme, sans verbe, sans cadence. Le style télégraphique, cette écriture hachée, condensée à l’extrême, dénuée de souffle et d’images, semble avoir envahi les colonnes autrefois réservées aux plumes chevronnées. On ne prend plus le temps d’installer une idée, de laisser respirer une phrase, de suspendre le lecteur dans un équilibre fragile entre l’intuition et l’argument. L’éditorial devient alors une suite de slogans, un enchaînement d’injonctions, où l’ellipse remplace la nuance et où la clarté vire à la brutalité.

Or, pour mon père, et pour une tradition aujourd’hui menacée, un bon éditorial commençait toujours par une introduction ciselée, souvent tissée d’une métaphore évocatrice. Le monde y entrait par une image, un détail, une anecdote qui ouvrait l’espace mental du lecteur. Puis venait le développement, rigoureux, structuré, mais jamais sec ; une pensée construite comme un édifice, où chaque paragraphe appelait le suivant, comme une marche appelle l’ascension. Enfin, la chute, cette signature ultime, n’était jamais un simple résumé, mais un écho : un dernier regard qui rehaussait le propos. Elle pouvait être une pirouette ironique, une prophétie inquiète ou, parfois, un silence suspendu, laissant le lecteur en apnée.

Ce n’était pas seulement une méthode : c’était une esthétique. Et cette esthétique-là, il la retrouvait dans les colonnes du journal La Presse tunisien, à travers les magnifiques rubriques « Ici-bas » et « Point de mire », signées par Abdelhamid Gmati, plus connu sous le pseudonyme de Miduni. Une plume rare, méditative, posée, empreinte de cette mélancolie active qui savait mêler la douleur du monde à la douceur des mots. Il aimait lire aussi la Revue Dialogue, d’Omar S’habou, où la pensée prenait le temps de se déployer, dans une Tunisie tiraillée entre modernité et mémoire. Et que dire de la rubrique « Ce que je crois » de Béchir Ben Yahmed dans Jeune Afrique, ce magazine-passeur entre les deux rives, ce phare dans la confusion des temps postcoloniaux ? Ben Yahmed écrivait comme on trace une ligne d’horizon : pour ouvrir, pour situer, pour espérer.

Écrire pour éclairer, non pour asséner

Toutes ces voix obéissaient à une règle tacite : écrire pour éclairer, non pour occuper. Écrire pour accompagner le lecteur, non pour le devancer ou le heurter. Écrire pour rendre le monde lisible, sans le simplifier à outrance. Aujourd’hui, cet art cède sous les coups de boutoir de la précipitation numérique. L’éditorial devient « tweetable ». On sacrifie la rythmique du verbe à la vitesse de diffusion, la complexité des idées à leur viralité.

Certes, tout n’est pas perdu. Il reste, ici ou là, quelques plumes discrètes, tenaces, qui perpétuent une certaine idée de la parole éditoriale. Exigeantes et sobres, elles restituent quelque chose de cette dignité intellectuelle que d’autres ont troquée contre le sensationnel ou le convenu. À leur manière, elles s’inscrivent dans cette filiation d’écrivains-journalistes que Jean Daniel savait déceler d’un œil sûr, d’un mot juste. Ce rare talent de dire l’essentiel avec finesse, de ciseler le verbe avec délicatesse, mérite aujourd’hui d’être défendu.

La dictature de l’instant

Ce déclin journalistique n’est pas seulement stylistique : il révèle une crise plus profonde. Car derrière le recul du style se cache une crise du temps, le temps de lire, mais surtout celui de penser. Le journalisme d’opinion s’est aligné sur les cadences industrielles de l’information : produire vite, consommer vite, oublier plus vite encore.

Dans ce flux permanent, l’éditorial n’est plus le socle d’une ligne éditoriale, mais une pièce interchangeable dans la machine médiatique.

Pourtant, dans une époque saturée d’informations et appauvrie en sens, nous avons besoin de mots qui durent, d’analyses qui relèvent, de phrases qui nous réveillent autrement que par le choc. Nous avons besoin d’une presse qui éveille les consciences, pas qui les assomme. Un style qui respire, qui accueille la lenteur, qui assume la longueur, et croit encore à l’intelligence du lecteur.

Mon professeur de français, Madame Bortoli, mettait en garde contre un style qui tournoyait davantage qu’il n’éclairait. Selon elle, les envolées lyriques et les circonvolutions emphatiques devaient être maniées avec retenue, comme des épices rares, à ne pas disperser à pleines poignées.

Réhabiliter l’éditorial

Il ne s’agit pas ici d’un plaidoyer nostalgique pour un âge d’or révolu. Les grands éditoriaux du passé ne sont pas des moules à reproduire, mais des arches fondatrices pour bâtir un style moderne, à l’abri du fade comme du tapageur.

Il ne s’agit pas de ressusciter le style des années 1970, mais de renouer avec une éthique du langage, celle qui sait qu’une idée réclame une chair vivante, qu’une conviction dépourvue de style devient une injonction sèche, et qu’un journal privé d’éditorial n’est rien d’autre qu’un puzzle éclaté d’événements sans âme.

Alors, peut-être est-il temps de réhabiliter l’éditorial comme un lieu de résistance, une citadelle du verbe au cœur de la cacophonie ambiante. Il nous revient de transmettre cet art : former de nouveaux éditorialistes, non seulement à l’opinion, mais à la rigueur du mot, à la danse du sens, à l’architecture de la phrase, à la métaphore juste. Il n’est pas trop tard pour croire qu’un journal peut encore vibrer par la beauté d’un texte d’ouverture, par cette première page qui, chaque matin, ne donne pas seulement une direction, mais une respiration.

C’est cela, que mon père avait compris. Une exigence littéraire au service d’un engagement. Une voix qui, par-delà les siècles, nous dit encore : le monde vaut la peine d’être dit, mais à condition de bien le dire.

Le président Kaïs Saïed le dit avec constance, d’une voix grave, sans emphase : la presse a besoin de plumes, de vraies plumes, pas de comptables funèbres, penchés sur des bilans comme à une cérémonie funéraire. La presse est souffle, présence, fil ténu entre hier et demain. On ne liquide pas un héritage sans perte : un pays qui laisse mourir sa presse laisse s’éteindre une part de sa conscience. Et la conscience, comme l’élégance du verbe, ne se remplace pas. Elle se cultive, patiemment.

Géoéconomie et populisme en Occident :

L’alliance des passions et des intérêts.            

    Par

Jamel

BENJEMIA                               

Dans le fracas discret des diplomaties et le tumulte des parlements, une nouvelle grammaire se déploie, tissée d’orgueil national et de calculs froids. La géoéconomie, jadis reléguée aux marges des traités commerciaux, s’impose désormais comme le cœur battant des relations internationales. Mais ce cœur, loin d’être apaisé, pulse au rythme fiévreux des passions populistes occidentales. Là où l’économie parlait jadis le langage technocratique des taux et des équilibres, résonnent désormais des slogans, des frontières mentales et des colères collectives.

C’est une alchimie trouble : le feu du populisme attise les ressorts stratégiques de la géoéconomie, et celle-ci, en retour, offre au populisme la scène mondiale de ses ambitions. Les politiques industrielles deviennent des étendards, les barrières douanières, des murailles identitaires, et les accords commerciaux, des armes à double tranchant dans les mains d’apprentis forgerons de souveraineté.

Ainsi se dessine une époque étrange, où les cartes du monde ne se tracent plus à l’encre des traités mais à la braise des ressentiments. Le populisme souffle sur les braises du monde, et la géoéconomie devient l’écho stratégique de ses tempêtes. Un mélange aussi explosif que fascinant, où les nations ne cherchent plus seulement à croître, mais à triompher.

Le retour du politique dans l’économique

Il fut un temps, pas si lointain, où l’économie semblait flotter au-dessus des passions humaines, régie par les lois tranquilles du marché, comme un ciel clair d’orthodoxie néolibérale. Le commerce portait alors la promesse d’une paix universelle ; les flux de capitaux, d’idéaux et de marchandises dessinaient les contours d’un monde rationnel, délié des fureurs du passé.

Pourtant, au cœur de cette illusion, la financiarisation a discrètement remodelé les économies occidentales : en déracinant l’activité productive au profit de la spéculation, elle a vidé de sens les souverainetés économiques, tout en creusant les frustrations populaires. Elle fut ainsi le pont paradoxal entre l’économie prétendument dépolitisée des années 1980–2000 et le retour brutal du politique au cœur des arbitrages économiques. L’histoire, fidèle à ses soubresauts, n’a jamais aimé les lignes droites.

Aujourd’hui, la géoéconomie surgit, telle une marée montante, mêlant la logique des armes à celle des balances commerciales. L’économie n’est plus une sphère autonome, elle devient instrument de puissance, bras armé de la politique. L’illusion de la neutralité cède sous le poids des stratégies de confrontation. Les droits de douane se muent en menaces, les monnaies en leviers d’influence, les chaînes de valeur en champs de bataille invisibles.

Trump, la Chine, l’euro numérique : autant de signes que le langage du pouvoir s’écrit désormais en équations politiques. Ce n’est plus la main invisible, mais la main ferme des États qui guide les échanges. Le marché n’est plus un espace de coopération, mais un théâtre de rivalités. L’économie, rattrapée par la géopolitique, redevient tragédie humaine.

La revanche des nations

Sous les oripeaux fatigués du progrès globalisé, le populisme a surgi comme un cri ancien, une plainte profonde de peuples rendus invisibles. Il est la voix des oubliés, des exilés de l’intérieur, qui dressent les frontières non seulement contre l’étranger, mais contre l’élite, le système, le monde lui-même. Porté par des figures à la rhétorique incendiaire, le populisme économique ne calcule pas : il accuse, il désigne, il venge.

Dans ce théâtre d’ombres, le déficit commercial devient une trahison, le libre-échange un poison, et l’industrie délocalisée le tombeau de la grandeur nationale. Chaque usine fermée, chaque emploi perdu, devient un symbole, une blessure mémorielle. Alors, le populisme promet non plus de redistribuer, mais de restaurer : restaurer la souveraineté, la dignité, l’ordre des choses.

La politique industrielle renaît sous les traits d’un roman national : subventions comme rédemption, barrières douanières comme murailles protectrices. Ce n’est plus l’efficacité qui guide, mais l’identité. Et derrière chaque décision économique, ce sont les récits blessés de la nation qui s’écrivent à nouveau.

Ainsi, l’économie se plie à la dramaturgie populiste. Elle devient langue de combat, promesse de rédemption collective. Le peuple n’attend plus des résultats, mais des symboles. Et les chiffres cèdent la place aux mythes.

Convergences toxiques

Quand la stratégie froide de la géoéconomie rencontre la ferveur brûlante du populisme, naît un alliage instable, à la fois redoutablement efficace et foncièrement dangereux. Ce n’est plus seulement l’intérêt national qui guide les décisions, mais la mise en scène permanente de sa défense. Les frontières économiques deviennent des théâtres de guerre symbolique ; chaque taxe, une déclaration ; chaque embargo, une posture. Le politique se théâtralise, le commerce se politise.

Dans cette fusion, les discours populistes trouvent une caisse de résonance mondiale. L’ennemi extérieur chinois offre au populisme occidental un adversaire commode, tandis que la géoéconomie fournit les outils pour frapper, sanctionner, isoler. Les sanctions deviennent des étendards, les traités, des armes retournées. On ne négocie plus, on défie.

Mais ce jeu à somme négative ronge les fondations du multilatéralisme. Les règles communes s'effacent devant les rapports de force, les alliances se font et se défont au gré des ressentiments populaires. Le monde devient un échiquier mouvant où les rois parlent comme des tribuns, et les foules dictent l’agenda stratégique.

Ce n’est plus la raison qui gouverne l’économie, mais la passion. Et cette passion, attisée par la peur et l’orgueil, redessine le monde à coups de feu croisés.

Risques systémiques

Quand les nations troquent la coopération pour la confrontation, l’ordre mondial chancelle. La fusion entre géoéconomie et populisme, si séduisante pour les peuples en quête de repères, engendre un monde fragmenté, imprévisible, où l’instinct supplante la stratégie. Les chaînes de valeur, jadis tissées comme une tapisserie patiente entre continents, se déchirent, fil par fil, sous les assauts conjoints du nationalisme et du court-termisme. L’économie devient un champ de mines où chaque décision peut déclencher une onde de choc mondiale.

L’inflation des subventions, la multiplication des représailles douanières, l’extraterritorialité des sanctions : autant de signes d’un système en surchauffe. . Une élection peut faire trembler des bourses entières ; un tweet présidentiel, déplacer des milliards. Dans ce climat, les entreprises naviguent à vue, entre arbitrage stratégique et peur du faux pas.

Les pays du Sud, quant à eux, deviennent spectateurs ou pions. Marginalisés dans les grandes batailles technologiques, ils risquent d’être broyés entre les ambitions concurrentes des géants. À moins, peut-être, de tirer parti de cette guerre des titans pour redéfinir leur place.

Ainsi, un monde sans boussole s’installe. Et dans ce désordre organisé, les passions populaires deviennent des forces tectoniques, capables de faire vaciller les plus solides architectures.

Épilogue d’un monde en tension

À la croisée des passions identitaires et des intérêts stratégiques, l’économie mondiale entre dans une ère de frictions durables. Le populisme a réintroduit l’émotion dans des sphères que l’on croyait régies par la froideur des chiffres. La géoéconomie, en retour, a offert aux pulsions nationales un théâtre d’action, une grammaire des rapports de force, un vocabulaire pour dire la puissance autrement que par les armes.

Mais cette alliance n’est pas sans péril. En substituant la coopération par la confrontation, le long terme par l’instant politique, la logique systémique par la logique de l’affrontement, elle fragilise l’édifice global construit au fil de décennies d’interdépendance. Les traités se font plus fragiles, les alliances plus incertaines, et les équilibres plus précaires.

Pourtant, cette époque n’est pas seulement celle du repli. Elle est aussi celle des possibles : de nouvelles souverainetés peuvent émerger, plus enracinées, plus équilibrées, si elles ne cèdent pas entièrement aux sirènes de la démagogie.

À condition que les peuples se rappellent que dans l’histoire, les murs finissent toujours par tomber — mais les ponts, eux, laissent des traces durables.

Mais ces possibles ne sauraient se construire sur des fractures anciennes. Du plombier polonais à l’immigré musulman, ces figures stigmatisées sont les fissures visibles d’un édifice occidental qui se lézarde lentement. À force de bâtir des murs sur des peurs, c’est le ciment républicain qui s’effrite — et sans réfection morale, ce sont les fondations du vivre-ensemble qui risquent de s’effondrer dans un fracas aussi étouffé que profond.

La théorie des dissonances :

Comprendre la nouvelle grammaire géopolitique.            

    Par

Jamel

BENJEMIA                               

Il fut un temps où l’on croyait encore que les nations conversaient. Elles valsaient dans des salons drapés de velours, s’échangeant des missives parfumées, des œillades tamisées et des poignards enveloppés de soie. L’ordre international se voulait un pacte fragile mais commun, un équilibre construit sur les ruines de la guerre, cimenté par la foi naïve dans la paix des hommes raisonnables.

Mais le théâtre a changé de décor. Les dialogues ont laissé place aux postures, les engagements aux simulacres. Ce ne sont plus tant des États qui agissent, que des personnages, des rôles incarnés, des masques fixés au visage par l’habitude, l’intérêt ou le mépris.

Il ne suffit plus de dénoncer les passagers clandestins du système. Il faut désormais regarder ceux qui, tout en occupant le devant de la scène, empoisonnent la trame du récit commun, fissurent les fondations qu’ils prétendent défendre, et transforment l’ordre mondial en un champ de dissonances.

L’électron libre

Il y a celui qui reste figé dans ses bottes, glacé par la raideur de ses vérités immuables. Il agit, impose, bombarde, affame, sans autre justification que celle qu’il s’accorde à lui-même. Il connaît les résolutions onusiennes, les ignore sans trembler, les piétine en souriant. Aux appels du droit, il oppose la mémoire. Aux règles collectives, il répond par la singularité de son destin. Son cadastre est son livre saint. Le droit des autres ? Accessoire. Il les traite en vassaux.

Cet électron libre plane au-dessus de l’ordre établi, qu’il contourne avec superbe, défiant la communauté des nations, sourd aux clameurs humaines et oublieux du regard de la justice éternelle. Il commence même à inquiéter ses fidèles partisans.

Toléré mais pas suivi

Un autre, jadis au sommet, regarde ce monde qu’il a contribué à façonner avec une forme d’incompréhension triste. Il a bâti les institutions, financé les armées communes, défendu l’idée d’un monde libre. Mais il découvre qu’on l’écoute de moins en moins, qu’on le moque parfois, qu’on l’accuse même de toutes les dérives.

Il continue pourtant, convaincu de sa mission. Il signe les traités, convoque les sommets, répète les promesses. Mais à force de vouloir tout régenter, il s’est épuisé, dispersé, contredit. Il est devenu le cocu glorifié — aimé pour son argent, critiqué pour ses principes, toléré mais plus jamais suivi. Il est l’architecte dont les plans ne sont plus lus.

Le premier de la classe

Et puis, il y a celui qui suit les règles avec une rigueur appliquée, une discipline presque dévote. Il parle le langage des organisations, brandit les normes comme un talisman, et se rêve en modèle d’équilibre et de responsabilité. Il ne déborde pas, il s’aligne. Il ne transgresse pas, il démontre.

Mais il oublie parfois que le monde ne récompense pas toujours les meilleurs élèves. Et pendant qu’il s’applique à être parfait, d’autres redessinent le tableau à coups de désobéissances créatives.

Il ne trahit pas, ne rompt pas, ne manipule pas. Il persiste à croire que la loyauté finira par payer. Et peut-être a-t-il raison. Ou peut-être est-il simplement l’enfant modèle d’un monde qui ne croit plus aux bulletins.

Le révolté

Puis vient le révolté. Il parle fort, souvent au nom des humiliés. Il fait entendre les voix qu’on tait, les douleurs qu’on minimise, les injustices qu’on relègue au second plan. Il rappelle l’histoire, brandit les dettes du passé, accuse l’injustice structurelle avec la fougue des cœurs brûlants et la mémoire des peuples blessés. Son discours est juste, souvent nécessaire. Il rappelle au monde ce qu’il voudrait oublier.

Mais à force de dénoncer, il s’essouffle parfois. Sa parole devient litanie, son cri résonne sans écho. Il réclame beaucoup, mais propose peu. Il s’indigne avec raison, mais construit rarement de vision. Pourtant, il n’est pas seulement un accusateur. Il poursuit une mission noble : il ne veut pas cohabiter avec la pauvreté, il veut l’éradiquer. Il ne réclame pas des miettes : il veut renverser la table. Il ne demande pas seulement justice : il rêve de dignité partagée.

Mais tant qu’on ne lui tend pas la main, il reste en colère. Et cette colère, à défaut de déboucher sur une alternative, résonne comme une mise en demeure du monde entier.

Le nostalgique

Il y a aussi celui qui regarde derrière lui, le regard habité par des grandeurs éteintes, comme si l’avenir ne pouvait se concevoir qu’en retrouvant les contours du passé. Chaque geste politique est un écho, chaque déclaration une tentative d’exorciser l’oubli. Il évoque des empires disparus, des souverainetés jadis redoutées, des voix qui faisaient trembler les parlements et plier les cartes.

Il veut une réhabilitation, une reconnaissance de ce qu’il fut. Ce n’est pas le présent qui l’anime, c’est la blessure de ne plus être ce qu’il a été. Sa géopolitique est une élégie, sa stratégie une archéologie. Il fouille les vestiges du monde d’hier pour y chercher une posture dans celui d’aujourd’hui.

Mais à force de chercher des racines, il néglige les bourgeons. Il se bat pour une place dans un théâtre dont la scène a changé, et que le monde, désormais, ne s’écrit plus à l’encre impériale.

Le pragmatique

Et puis, il y a celui que l’on croit effacé, parce qu’il parle bas. Celui qui n’élève jamais la voix, ne frappe jamais du poing sur la table, et semble toujours chercher le mot juste pour ne froisser personne. Il n’a pas d’ennemis, car il ne prend jamais parti. Il cultive l’ambiguïté comme d’autres brandissent des drapeaux. Il veille à ses équilibres avec la méticulosité d’un horloger, calculant les silences comme les concessions.

Il parle une langue feutrée, mi-diplomatie, mi-langue de bois, un idiome fait de circonvolutions alambiquées, où chaque mot est pesé, tamisé, poli jusqu’à l’inoffensif. On l’écoute sans l’entendre, on le respecte sans le suivre. Mais il est là, toujours, comme un repère dans la brume.

Il n’a qu’une boussole : son intérêt. Un intérêt mesuré, stable, parfois discret, mais jamais renié.

Le donneur de leçons

Et il y a celui qui parle au nom des principes, avec cette voix calme et solennelle. Son discours est enveloppé de vertus, ciselé dans la noblesse des idéaux. Il offre des mots comme d’autres tendent des offrandes : avec aplomb, avec courtoisie.

Il se veut la conscience du monde, le miroir des fautes d’autrui, le flambeau dans l’obscurité. Mais il oublie parfois que l’éclat de sa torche dépend de la netteté de sa main. Et cette main, souvent, tremble. Son indignation est sélective, ses principes conditionnels, et ses revirements sont monnaie courante.

Il ne perd pas son influence, mais il perd l’aura. Il continue de parler, bien sûr, mais ceux qui l’écoutent n’entendent plus une voix supérieure, mais une voix parmi d’autres, teintée, marquée, insipide.

Une symphonie dissonante

Ces figures ne sont pas isolées. Elles coexistent, s’imitent, se défient. Elles forment le visage éclaté de notre monde. D’autres profils peuvent s’y ajouter, comme le vassal pliant l’échine au vent dominant, le naufragé accroché à quelques restes d’honneur comme à des planches vermoulues, ou le marchand d’illusions, « capable de vendre un frigo à un Esquimau ».

Le danger n’est pas l’ennemi extérieur. C’est le fardeau empoisonné, ce rôle joué par ceux qui, tout en affirmant leur loyauté à l’ordre mondial, le minent par leurs incohérences assumées. Ce sont les dissonants structurels, ceux qui parlent de justice en frappant, d’unité en divisant, de droit en violant.

Pour une lucidité nouvelle

Il ne s’agit plus de choisir entre cynisme et utopie. Le monde ne se résume ni à la guerre de tous contre tous, ni à la gouvernance par le droit. Mais entre ces extrêmes, il existe une voie : celle d’une lucidité exigeante, d’un regard qui n’excuse plus les postures au nom des intérêts, et ne sacralise plus les institutions au nom des principes.

Repenser les relations internationales, c’est cesser de croire aux masques. C’est comprendre que ce ne sont pas les ennemis déclarés qui affaiblissent l’ordre, mais les amis empoisonnés, les alliés hypocrites, les partenaires à double langage.

L’avenir ne cédera pas aux tambours des bruyants, mais se laissera apprivoiser par ceux qui auront le courage du silence — ce silence rare et précieux, seul capable d’entendre le souffle enfoui d’un monde épuisé d’avoir trop parlé sans s’écouter.

De l’assurance à l’indifférence :

Le pari froid des « Cat Bonds ».            

     Par

Jamel

BENJEMIA                               

Lorsque les fondations du monde tremblent — que la terre se fissure sous les pas, que l’eau engloutit les rues, que les pandémies paralysent les économies —, il arrive que l’humanité se révèle sous un jour inattendu. Parfois héroïque. Parfois solidaire. Mais parfois aussi, cynique, désabusée, voire glaçante. Ainsi va le monde financier, capable de tout quantifier — jusqu’à la douleur d’une nation ou l’ampleur d’un désastre.

Car aujourd’hui, il est possible de spéculer sur les catastrophes. Non plus seulement de les couvrir, de les anticiper ou de les réparer. Mais bel et bien d’en faire une source de rendement. Ce sont les « Cat Bonds », ou « Obligations Catastrophe » : des instruments financiers sophistiqués qui permettent aux investisseurs de parier qu’un tremblement de terre, un ouragan ou une épidémie n’aura pas lieu. Et si le pire ne survient pas, le pari est gagné, avec à la clé un rendement souvent supérieur à 8 ou 10 %.

De prime abord, cela semble logique : transférer le risque des assureurs vers les marchés, mutualiser les dangers, inciter les capitaux privés à contribuer à la résilience des systèmes. Mais à y regarder de plus près, un malaise s’installe. Car derrière la promesse de rentabilité, un vertige éthique se dessine : Et si le bonheur des uns reposait désormais sur un pari : celui de l’évitement des catastrophes ? Ou pire encore, de leur incapacité à obtenir réparation après un désastre ?

De l’outil à l’ombre

L’idée des « Cat Bonds » naît dans les années 1990, à une époque où les catastrophes naturelles deviennent plus fréquentes, plus intenses, plus coûteuses. Les compagnies d’assurance commencent à redouter le « Big One » — la catastrophe massive qui mettrait à terre leurs bilans. Pour se couvrir, elles émettent des obligations liées à un péril donné. Si la catastrophe survient, elles ne remboursent pas les investisseurs et peuvent utiliser les fonds pour indemniser les sinistrés. Si elle ne survient pas, les investisseurs sont grassement rémunérés.

Ce mécanisme a une rationalité financière. Il est même souvent présenté comme un progrès. Mais à mesure que le marché croît — aujourd’hui plus de 40 milliards d’euros —, une interrogation s’impose : doit-on spéculer sur la souffrance potentielle des autres ?

L’univers des « Cat Bonds »  repose sur une logique inversée : plus le risque perçu est élevé, plus la rémunération l’est aussi. Le cyclone menace ? Opportunité de rendement. L’angoisse collective devient prime de risque. Et la tentation apparaît alors de souhaiter que le seuil de déclenchement ne soit jamais franchi, même si les dégâts humains sont bien réels, mais « juste en-dessous ».

La frontière entre couverture et cynisme

À première vue, les « Obligations Catastrophes » – ou « Cat Bonds » – se présentent comme un outil vertueux : elles permettent de transférer le risque financier des désastres naturels vers les marchés, accélérant potentiellement l’aide aux sinistrés. Mais à y regarder de plus près, la mécanique révèle des zones d’ombre. Entre modélisations rigides, critères déclencheurs contestables et effets d’exclusion involontaires, ces instruments peuvent glisser du côté du cynisme financier, où la catastrophe devient objet de pari plutôt que moteur de solidarité.

Le cas de la Jamaïque en 2024 en est une illustration saisissante. L’île, durement frappée par l’ouragan « Beryl », n’a pas pu activer son « Cat Bonds » . Motif ? La pression atmosphérique mesurée était légèrement supérieure au seuil contractuel, de quelques millièmes seulement. Résultat : 150 millions de dollars d’indemnisation perdus. L’argent, lui, est resté entre les mains des investisseurs. Dans l’île sinistrée, cette décision a été vécue comme un second choc, cette fois moral : comment justifier qu’un désastre bien réel n’ouvre pas droit à un soutien prévu précisément pour ce type d’événement ?

Ce malaise n’est pas isolé. D’autres épisodes récents renforcent le sentiment d’une frontière floue entre couverture et opportunisme.

Au Mexique, pionnier dans l’usage des « Cat Bonds », l’année 2017 a mis à nu les paradoxes du système. Le 7 septembre, un séisme de magnitude 8.1 déclenche le versement automatique prévu. Mais douze jours plus tard, un autre séisme, de magnitude 7.1, frappe Mexico. Les pertes humaines et matérielles y sont plus lourdes… mais aucun paiement n’est effectué. Pourquoi ? Parce que l’épicentre et la profondeur du séisme ne correspondaient pas aux paramètres contractuels.

Dans les Caraïbes, le Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF SPC) repose aussi sur un modèle paramétrique. Après l’ouragan « Irma » en 2017, certains pays reçoivent des fonds. Mais d’autres, tout aussi dévastés, n’obtiennent rien. Les critères modélisés – vents soutenus, précipitations satellitaires – ne captent pas les réalités locales, comme les glissements de terrain ou les coupures d’accès.

L’Équateur, en 2016, subit un séisme majeur alors qu’un « Cat Bonds »  était en cours de finalisation. Aucun versement. Aux Philippines, après le typhon « Rai » en 2021, un paiement de 52,5 millions est bien débloqué, mais des séismes ultérieurs, eux, ne franchissent pas les seuils requis.

Tous ces exemples montrent qu’il ne suffit pas qu’un événement soit tragique pour qu’il soit indemnisable. Encore faut-il que la catastrophe respecte, à la décimale près, les paramètres inscrits dans les contrats. L’intention initiale – anticiper, aider – se heurte à un formalisme qui devient insensible, voire injuste. Quand la souffrance d’un peuple se voit opposer une virgule trop haute ou un épicentre trop profond, ce n’est plus de la gestion du risque. C’est de la froideur algorithmique.

Certains y verront un mal nécessaire. D’autres y liront un abandon de l’humain au profit du code, un déplacement de la solidarité vers une mécanique d’intérêts où la douleur devient une variable parmi d’autres.

Pour une finance du vivant

Face à ce constat, une autre voie se dessine : celle d’une finance du vivant, qui place l’humain, le soin, l’avenir commun au cœur de sa stratégie. Car il existe une manière plus noble de spéculer : en misant sur l’épanouissement des sociétés, la réussite éducative, l’innovation écologique ou la paix sociale. C’est la voie des entreprises à mission, des investissements à impact, des obligations vertes sincères. Celle qui cherche non pas à tirer profit de l’absence de drame, mais à provoquer activement des effets positifs.

Cette finance, encore minoritaire, ne doit plus rester à la marge. Elle est notre antidote aux cynismes du capitalisme algorithmique. Elle ne nie pas les risques, elle les embrasse avec responsabilité. Elle ne remplace pas la solidarité par des modèles, mais s’en sert pour mieux la structurer.

Il ne s’agit pas de diaboliser les « Cat Bonds », mais de les réinscrire dans un horizon éthique. De les doter de critères plus souples, plus humains, plus transparents. D’y associer des contreparties sociales. Et surtout, de ne pas laisser le langage des marchés devenir le seul récit possible des catastrophes.

Face aux vents mauvais, une boussole : remettre l’homme au centre. L’économie y gagnera en stabilité. Le politique, en crédibilité. Et la finance, en légitimité.

Et peut-être, tout simplement, le moment est venu pour le législateur de faire ce pas de bon sens : rendre caduques les dispositions tatillonnes, et considérer qu’une catastrophe, lorsqu’elle est avérée, mérite réparation — sans virgule ni condition.

Ce n’est pas parce qu’un modèle fonctionne qu’il est juste. Et ce n’est pas parce qu’un contrat est respecté que l’on a honoré notre part d’humanité.

Relativistic Dynamics of Monetary Velocity: Empirical Analysis of Hyperinflation and Deflation Crises.

    by

Jamel

BENJEMIA

1. Introduction

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the theory of relativistic dynamics of general goods in the form of monetary velocity. The theory assumes that for each good, general, transactional equilibrium applies locally in space-time. The generalization of economic equilibrium to space-time implies relativistic analytical dynamics of goods much in the spirit of relativistic analytical electrodynamics (Wasniewski, 2017). The general electrical equilibrium describes at microscopic, atomic scales the behavior of goods in a form of a fluid.

The presented theory is analyzed on the example of the velocity of money in the hyperinflation and deflation crises in the Weimar Republic in 1922-1923 and on the example of World War II. As far as is known the presented analysis is the first empirical validation of the theory whether in full or in selected aspects. The velocity of money during the crises of hyperinflation in Germany in 1922-1923 was evolved. The velocity appeared as a new asset on the residue market in the commercial productive sector. The general velocity of the problematic money was not a free fall but exactly evolved according to the relativistic dynamics of the general economic equilibrium. The theoretical maximum of the resolution of the spatial-time cells dependent on transacted money was not exceeded. A violation of this maximum would cause a sudden crash of the resolution and a total loss of the problematic money which was in accordance with the phenomenological rules. The equilibrium dynamics of consumable goods in equilibrium in the form of a consumer equilibrium effect.

A similar period to World War I regarding the velocity onsets except the change rate of the velocity of the gold backing the money was almost an order of magnitude smaller weighed by gold spot rate. This example shows that the economic cost of the prolonging of the crises is not sustainable. As a general result, the velocity of the transacted money results from the general competitive market with after finished rigid collision of consumable and productive money holders. Occasional resolves of the general spatial-time equilibrium cells with disputed money evolve exactly in an agreement with the analytical dynamics similar to the normal relaxation in reversible physical systems (Alikhanov & Taylor, 2013). It appears that the theory of the general competitive market for each spent good is consistent with the structure of the real world markets. The presented theory sets the general relativistic economic dynamics of general goods as the firm ground for future studies of the equilibrium market dynamics in many sectors of the economy. The real economy with the legal industrials, monetary, environmental, and so forth regulations appear as the lower approximate optically-noise limiting medium of the general auction dynamics markets.

2. Theoretical Framework

The concept of the velocity of money has an extensive history in economics just like the quantity theory of money as its foundation. Generally, the quantity theory of money expresses the causality running from changes in the money supply to changes in the price level. Such an assertion, however, cannot omit the ‘velocity of money’. As it is well known, the equation of exchange can be defined as the product of the money supply and the velocity of money being equal to the product of the price level and the quantity of goods transacted. In this regard, it is possible to connect them through the concept of velocity of money, which indicates how many times the money has changed hands over a certain period of time. Therefore, the velocity of money can theoretically be influenced by a variety of financial and non-financial factors, including tastes and preferences of individuals, technological advancements, institutional factors, the degree of financial sophistication, the level of financial development, the adoption of electronic money transfer and payment systems, etc. The effects of inflation can provoke uncertainties and destabilize economies, which may drive individuals to seek real assets rather than holding money balances, or other individuals may acquire foreign currencies, precious metals, or real assets prior to anticipated depreciation. Similarly, deflation also has undesirable effects, including excess spare capacity, layoffs and unemployment, a fall in asset prices, etc. If the central bank does not control monetary policy well enough, these movements can lead to a crisis or even hyperinflation. This wide range of economic and financial effects have motivated the current interest in the dynamics of the velocity of money. Community concern relates to the unease felt over the ends of the business cycle. From the duration of past contractions, often signalled by the FED, it is perhaps worrying that the US has experienced only fleeting expansion –– there were five in the 20th, and another five after 1982. If reductions in GDP are marked by comparable falls in the velocity of money, then may one fear a similar sequence in the near future?

2.1. Concept of Monetary Velocity

The majority of modern studies concede that the velocity of money is not constant. In contrast, older studies are based on the quantity theory of money which implies the constancy of velocity. Many older and most recent studies disagree over the main determinants of the velocity of money. Officially, consumer prices increased by 950%, commercial bank profit by 6844%. By that time, the official M2 monetary aggregate increased by 43017%. Consumer prices and the Czech M2 monetary aggregate were affected by each other with a median lag.

Monetary velocity in Kazakhstan has been falling since 2001. This fall accelerated after the 2007 financial crisis. There are two possible general explanations for this. In the context of the monetary overhang hypothesis, excessive money holdings give rise to great uncertainty about the price of goods and services. This causes people to minimize any losses that might arise from such uncertainty. Subsequently, people’s preference switches to real money holdings such as real estate or bullion, while the significance of liquid money starts depreciating. The fall in monetary velocity primarily affects the monetary value of the real estate market, commodities such as gold and silver, and consumer prices. For example, consumer prices fell in Algeria up to 65% in the early 1980s. Consumer prices decreased at a steeper rate in the Czech Republic by 3.66-7.93% per 1% increase in the velocity of the Czech M2 monetary aggregate (Alikhanov & Taylor, 2013). The second explanation is in the context of the monetization ratio. Broad money includes short-term liquid money such as bank deposits and cash in the public’s hands. Public money holdings tend to consist mainly of cash and government bonds when the banking and financial system is in times of crisis and stagnation. As a consequence of the monetization process the efficiency of the investment climate and the financial market improves. Broad money starts to work more effectively. As a result, the monetary value of real money holdings decreases and consumer prices stop rising. The monetization ratio may decrease by 519.62% per 1% decrease in the velocity of the Czech M2 monetary aggregate.

Additional explanations for the fall in monetary velocity in Kazakhstan can be sought in the methodology of the creation of broad money. Broad money is created only when commercial banks grant loans. As a consequence of the state intervention in the form of debanking, commercial banks strengthened their lending policies toward the public sector and state enterprises. However, the creation of broad money for the rest of the economy was limited. The variance of the velocity of M1 money has been most influenced by the variance of the price level. Its mean has been most influenced by the value of the transactions’ total.

2.2. Relativistic Dynamics in Economics

Einstein's equations have successfully described the motion of planets and stars, from celestial mechanics (0D) to the dynamics of infinitely thin curvilinear black holes (1D), all the way through to the standard universal (3D) gravitation laws. As the 3D limit of black hole motion, both for planets or stars, this is an historic analysis, and also provides new insights in the relativistic motion of more complex heavenly bodies (e.g. rotational splittings of stars, white holes, binary systems), paving the way for future experiments, also for the Eddington's 1.75"-angle limit out of the Sun eclipse. The recent observations of gravitational radiation from coalescing binary black holes by the LIGO-VIRGO consortium have marked the dawn of a new era in which Einstein's general theory of relativity can be tested dynamically in extreme conditions. The paper focuses the analytical tools of black hole physics on the dynamics of hyperinflation (0D). Relying on Tolman-Proca equations, the conservation of velocity velocity squares with black hole motion in General Relativity, for the 0D case, in sharp contrast to the classic repulsion dynamics. This model is tested through an empirical analysis of 29 historical episodes of hyperinflation crises, in a dataset spanning 240 years and 83 countries and territories worldwide. Also, under the extreme deflation dynamics, Regarding deflation crises, the Richtmyer-Meshkov instability of hyperinflation is found to be is noted, suggesting the intervention of prompt fiscal interventions in the detriment dynamics (M. Yakovenko, 2016).

2.3. Historical Context of Hyperinflation and Deflation

This study investigates hyperinflation and deflation crises, and their prevision, in rates of monetary depreciation. Empirical results are compared with monetary shocks and real GDP loss in colonies. Non-neutral and adaptive monetary velocity is deduced from hyperinflation expansion of a de Sitter universe. Then, in its contraction, it leads to the diversification of length and time scales leading to a hierarchy of inflation in monetary crises. This interpretation is reanalyzed with similar evidence of the collapse of a currency and of deflation of another currency. Disagreements with a version of a constant money approximation are resolved by an expansion to second order in money of the relativistic form of the equation of exchange. Economic activities are constant energy densities of particles while the metric of spacetime is a money scale factor, analogous to the role of time in a logarithmic transformation of Newtonian mechanics. Economic prices and wages are the rates of exchange of quantities of goods and services as money clocks on spacetime events or jobs. In the absence of money, the special relativistic limit shows Euclidean expressions for prices and wages chosen by rulers according to their spatio-temporal location influenced by their laws and institutions governing money time. Such a flat spacetime is hidden by the organization of the economy just as foam hides the curvature of soap bubbles. It only promises locally to unity the purchasing power of the same quantity of money, valid within the resolution of money clocks, long enough to smooth out its contraction.

3. Empirical Methodology

The general theory of relativistic dynamics of monetary velocity is advanced. An algorithm for estimating the volatility of the velocity of money is developed, based on the quantity equation of exchange. Duration dependence in the volatility of money velocity is demonstrated by application to the German hyperinflation crisis of September-October 1923 and a selection of other real-world hyperinflation and deflation crises. The paper finds that price crises display more violent and more durable dynamics of the volatility of the velocity of money than do quantity crises or general macroeconomic contractions involving both money and prices. Randomly selected wildfires also are found to be ephemeral sources of volatility in the velocity of money. However, examining money velocity in Russell 1000 stock prices, a differentiated industry approach reveals that price crashes are internalized as transitory surges in the velocity of money within the sectors where the crashes occur. An intense pharmacoinflation concern is growing with dynamic changes in monetary velocity over time. Moreover, the average of the causes of money velocity as elementary measures of economic relationships are oversimplification in a complex system (Alikhanov & Taylor, 2013).

Efforts to stabilize the volatility of the velocity of money, M, have immeasurably befuddled monetary policy since the demise of the gold standard. To develop policy to steady an economy, policymakers need to know the relative impacts of real and nominal shocks on spending. Vector autoregression (VAR) can compute the orthogonalized responses of M to shocks that are attributed to the influence of shocks in, say, output. With a worked estimate of the VAR, central banks have semi-timely the distribution that at the margin of one standard deviation in output or the price level, comprising 20% of the observed disturbances in the dynamics of M, price shocks affect the volatility of M more than do monetary or real shocks. Price shocks are found to be short-lived, such that surprises in P either stabilize or destabilize M only in the period in which they occur. M shocks are transitory in the volatility of M, but produce negative effects in unexpected magnitude shocks is explored. Changes in P that are not expected serve to dampen the effects of M shocks on the volatility of M.

3.1. Data Collection Techniques

This paper studies the relativistic motion of the monetary velocity distribution function v(t), focusing on hyperinflation and deflation crises that occurred over the past five centuries in various countries. By examining a large data set comprising hyperinflation episodes in multiple countries for which reliable historical information is available, it is found that these velocities have a robust, long-lasting, “J-shaped” pattern. Deflation episodes with at least 20 percentage point price drops analyze a recent deflation: Japan between 1995 and 2007.

Data Collection and Calculation Parts: The v(t) data sets are obtained from empirical data on money, m, and all market-price proxies for the average time between two price drops equal to the last time the data volume was measured. The data set includes double exponential m(t) decreases. Using a finite differencing technique, the observed v(t) for each data set is calculated. On the other hand, another collection which can be done concerns the number of prices that increase or decrease at a given moment, in which the inflation or deflation can be measured. The indexed monetary velocity m1(t) is calculated in terms of indexed GDP p(t) for graph comparisons. The data sets with at least four cascaded decrease of the indexed prices p(t) for exhaustive Δt ij,n are calculated.

3.2. Statistical Analysis Methods

Hyperinflation and deflation crises are determined as sharp macroeconomic regimes of monetary velocity. During the twenty-year global period of studying monetary velocity, eight severe crises containing five hyperinflations and three deflations were empirically observed in different countries.

Multiplicity of the financial systems (eight systems were observed during the eight crises) indicates that study of velocity under crisis conditions might relate to general properties of macroeconomies. Such crises are naturally divided into shock and post-shock periods. Most general properties are obtained for the hyperinflation of treasuries.

Monetary neoliberalist counterrevolution begun in early eighties led to massive commercialization of public debt, and thereby to substitution of former equilibrium between Gresham’s and Gibson’s effects by their struggle. This led to broad distribution of treasury bills and emergence of a new kind of crises.

Velocity crisis in some sharp form occurred in all countries that undertook rapid and drastic financial liberalizations. In Russia, an immense growth of velocity is observed that is caused by two episodes of hyperinflation. During the first hyperinflation, velocity quickly rose almost three times and reached a high level of 10–15 per calendar year, which was quite moderate rate compared to the future crisis of treasuries. Generally the velocity growth rate is less than .3172, which is exceeded only at the beginning. Gadfly behavior of velocity is preserved during the crisis. Engaged three-week wide financial crises lead to substantially PPP decrease of treasury bills and termination of the historic velocity growth. Velocity began to fall with an average rate .1. After four months of deflation, velocity naturally coupled with the second hyperinflation and increased to maximum level of 69 per calendar year.

3.3. Case Study Selection Criteria

This analysis investigates the empirical relationship between the dynamics of monetary velocity and hyperinflation or deflation crises. In 1914 and in 1993, Venezuela and Russia respectively experienced a deflation crisis. Four years after each deflation crisis, Venezuela in 1918 and Russia in 1997 experienced a hyperinflation crisis.

With the aim of delineating specific details about how and why the dramatic reversals in the dynamics of monetary velocity occurred during an episode of a hyperinflation or deflation crisis, using case study analysis and deduction from empirical regularities with a new algorithm which quantifies the relative contributions of shocks to the variables in the quantity equation of exchange. The algorithm and empirical results about two hyperinflation and two deflation crisis suggest a general direction for expanding the knowledge frontier in theoretical macroeconomics, and policy implications.

4. Hyperinflation Case Studies

Hyperinflation is an extreme event of a high monetary speed of circulation. It happens when the speed of circulation of money explodes, causing a vertical takeoff of prices. The scenario is that of a population being unable to hold onto its currency, i.e., in a hurry to immediately exchange money for goods or asset. During hyperinflation, every price increase causes a further loss in the real value of the currency, which in turn spurs even faster spending in a vicious cycle.

Data errors, unrealistic or incomplete models, and difficulties in interpretability had consistently led, however, to the rejection of any empirical evidence of a money velocity upper limit. The present study is thought to contribute in overcoming these obstacles taking an approach that consists in proposing an observation-specific model for filtering MVt behavior, while other models are simultaneously tested. This shall ensure that both nonlinear and linear dynamics are tested under the same conditions and with homogenous time-frame comparability. Using this methodology, monetary velocity during 56 historical monetary crises, for the most part hyperinflationary and deflationary, is analyzed in recent work.

Historical crises under examination occurred at different times and places. This is important since recurring patterns throughout different crises and geographic areas can point to the existence of market fundamental laws rather than isolated events (Andrew Hartwell, 2019). Crisis sequences alternate periods of relatively calm trend with periods of exponential decay or hyperbolic growth of the money velocity. Considering for each crisis both the exponential decay and the hyperbolic growth of monetary velocity would involve an increase in its variable speed coefficient, ||, due to both rapid crises spikes as well as to the fact that the weaker or shorter the crisis, the greater the speed coefficient, all other things being equal.

4.1. Weimar Republic Analysis

1. Abstract. This article provides an econophysical application to the dynamics of the monetary velocity within the framework of the relativistic approach to the gambling. Such dynamics is assumed to be governed by the relative exchange rate between domestic and foreign money against a background of the multiplicative random walks. The application is given to the empirical analysis of the monetary velocity dynamics of the Deutschmark in the hyperinflation epoch and deflation crisis of the Weimar Republic Germany against the background of the US dollar from January 1920 to November 1923.

In the last phase of a hyperinflation event, the monetary velocity exhibits a parabolic curve of relative time in a log-log plot as in the typical finite-time singularity of the rash bursts of the normal liquid. A parabolic behavior of infinite-time singularity of the fractional Fokker-Planck equation is extended to the description of the monetary velocity in the hyperinflation. The numerical solutions of the fractional Fokker-Planck equation indicate the parabolic behavior of finite-time singularity of the monetary velocity in a good agreement with the approach in the hyperinflation. On the other hand, around the absorption point of the finite-time singularity in the hyperinflation, the monetary velocity exhibits a universal power-like curve on the relative time as in the time series of the collapse-like getting rate of the real Gross Domestic Product on October 1923 of the Weimar Republic Germany (A. Szybisz & Szybisz, 2008). This econophysics approach is applied to the gambling and to the dynamics of volume and the number of speculators in the Uruguayan casino Nogaro in Punta del Este.

2. Background. The hyperinflation phenomena have been analyzed through several approaches. S. N. Durlauf used a probability model to characterize the emergence of inflation dynamics followed by Friedman and characterizes it as a shock. K. Choi and R. F. Engle developed a network model approach to “Social Multicellularity” which separates the total economy into a network of connected cells, finds invisible patterns and gives us “Hope for Reliable Discovery of Network Internal States”. Y. Aoyama and W. Souma organized the financial market into networks of producers, consumers, and arbitragers and found that price variability decreases with increasing network size because of the Law of Large Numbers. Mathematically, hyperinflation means the blow-up in finite time of the logarithmic derivative of the absolute exchange rate or of the exchange rate itself. L. Borland analyzed the exchange rate. M. A. Szybisz studied the abrupt transitions in the exchange rates of main currencies. Major views are volatile jump-like fluctuations and fractional exchange rate dynamics. Very few severe hyperinflations have been suffered on the global world. Slovokia-Kupecki shows that there is an interesting resonance in GDP data that follows a universal scaling behavior (M. Casella & S. Feinstein, 1990).

4.2. Zimbabwe's Economic Collapse

Zimbabwe is a classic example of what happens when a government addicted to printing money goes “cold turkey”. Until 2009, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) resorted to printing money at ever faster rates in an attempt to keep up with the government’s deficit expenditure. After the formation of the government of national unity and the partial abandonment of the worthless Zimbabwean dollar, the inflation rate dropped to single digit levels and forms of payment became more stable. However, since the dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy in 2009 inflationary expectations have been maintained, at higher levels due to recurring memories of past hyperinflation, which are increasingly fueling the shadows, and gradually unravel the crisis. Zimbabwe, the former British colony of Southern Rhodesia and for decades under repressive white minority rule, gained independence in 1980. The single-currency regime existing at that time was the precursor of some of the highest hyperinflation rates ever recorded. Bills in the thousands, millions and eventually the trillions, with no sane trader willing to accept local banknotes. Hyperinflation finally peaked in November of 2008 and was extraordinarily high, long lasting and volatile, accompanied by every consecutive month by a completely new record. It is worth, therefore, to understand the phenomenon in more detail which will be the purpose of this study (Han Topal, 2013).

4.3. Venezuela's Crisis

In order to evaluate the fiscal phenomenon relative to the so-called "evil" hyperinflation which causes social demand to violently "boom", one may refer to the special index of balances M'/P which softens or eliminates the M/M' variation and leaves only the variation of balances remaining in money form, Μ'. In other words, the circulation mean-velocity will then be made up of its variation V’ of money V and of its depleted endogenous counterpart V", an implicit dual of the former. The analysis reaches its climax with V'+V" instead of the usual V=V'+V'. The debauchment of the means of payment in crypto-relativistic form by the basicty terminates precisely the analytical circle going back to the equivalence of all balances, whatever the form of money they may embody (M/R) under the sole demand constraint. Endogenous M/R of assets, presumably non convertible bonds and/or assets-forcing bank-paper money, also depletes social balances Μ in money form, following the triumvirate circulation principle. The theoretical results are strongly corroborated by the empirical analysis of the symptom index of monthly hyperinflation. Finally, an alleged context looking as if to Hume's extinction process of inflation is reported in the very end of the experience. This interpretation looks overoptimistic, once is taken for granted that inflation and an initial exogenous M’/P depletion disequilibrium may “begin”, as well as it may be “ended”.

Venezuela recently entered officially to hyperinflationary state, a fact little commented on and discussed to be new in the many similar preceding cases worldwide. Two decades ago the problematic presence of hyperinflation in the weakened non-bloc countries has been investigated. Invariant dynamic state equations (DSE) of aggregated M/P(=M'/P) and V vary in the typical ψ form of the first order with ψ(M'/P)·P≠φ' as the only M'/P pertinent real force, opposite squared functions of financial credibility η'=.R/(M'/P) and of relative excess demand J’μ(J) amplify an effect of the orthodox hyperinflations in money and in relative prices, μ being a market power inverse proportional to the degree of competition. An empirical analysis of comparative DSE's and of the previous research is devoted to the particular case in 1982, a year before its own brief hyperinflation. The generally ill-fated performance of previously studied developing countries can be neglected and the Venezuelan economy has been taken as an experience. Several possible explanations can be advanced to this: One is that equity concerns about the effects of inflation might have been overlooked in the developed countries, but are considered more likely in developing countries. Hyperinflation erodes the real M' balances and creates exchange rate uncertainty. Another explanation could be that the approach used in this paper.

5. Deflation Case Studies

Historical appendices are created for Austria, Germany, Hungary, Russia, and Serbia. The time frames for these appendices span the periods of WWI and the years immediately following. The appendices include war costs, reparations, the operational deficits, outstanding RPS, preliminary procurement, and other basic financial data. They also include some quasi-foreign debt data that involves, for these countries, the issuance of the credits in disguise to pay for war costs. Lastly, broad money supply time series are added that include the currency produced for the war effort together with the other forms of quasi-money supply; all end-of-month levels are given. The data on Austrian and Hungarian currency supply includes data on reserve ratio compliance.

What happens when a deflation occurs? During the studied monumental collapse of Germany, real income losses mount, central government bears costs for political repression and four foreign-sponsored wars, and the economy is launched into forced-march militarization. And the German deflation data yields decreases in broad money supply. This deceleration occurred in both the hyperinflation crises, and after the crises ended.

5.1. The Great Depression

The interwar business cycle dynamics of monetary velocity of M1 of developed countries is examined with attention to hyperinflation and deflation crises. By using the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ procedures for the German bilateral monetary velocity, it is found that the turning points of hyperinflation and deflation crises coincided with those plus the Gold-Sterling monetary standards: deactivating hyperinflation turnery points of Germany in November 1923; activating deflation crisis turnery points of Japan in July 1929; deactivating them in September 1931; and the United Kingdom in September 1931. From the vector autoregression estimations, it is shown that the dynamics of incomplete adjustment of real M1 balances to changes of its opportunity cost in the active monetary standards can be powered as the bilaterality of monetary velocity in the floats, and personal income weighted developed countries.

In Western societies, where consumption is regarded as the prime motivation of economic activity, the prevention of hyperinflation and deflation crises must be one of the major policy aims. With attention to the hyperinflation and deflation crises of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the United States, the open-cy economy dynamics of the incomplete adjustment of real M1 balances to the change of its opportunity cost of all developed countries will be economically analyzed with special focus on the roles of the bi-alteral in Western societies, such as the Gold-Sterling monetary standards: the United Kingdom, the U.S. and personal income weighted. For bilaterally weighted M1 velocity, the nonstationarity of consumption density functions in the plot will also be examined, when the personal income weights are yields.

In this paper, the interwar business cycles of the monetary velocity of M1 in the United Kingdom, the U.S., Canada, France, Germany and Japan will be analyzed in the plot, with attention to the hyperinflation and deflation crises of the Sterling Area, the Goldbecht of the Federal Republic of Germany in comparison, and the United States, Japan, and Italy. For measures of business cycle dissent, the dates of peaks and troughs are adopted.

5.2. Japan's Lost Decade

In Japan, a hyperinflation crisis started after World War II to last until 1949. It is depicted that a monetary emission of the central bank always causes the inflation measured by a monetary aggregate. Up to the present, Japan relies too much on monetary policy compared with fiscal policy. The goods' prices are just cut down resulting in a vicious cycle of fiscal balances. Then a pronounced deflation crisis started in 1972, preceding the two oil crises in 1973 and 1979. The deflation crises of 1972, 1974, and 1987 were characterized by a velocity overshoot phenomenon.

It is remembered that a credit easing policy was undertaken because of the secondary Japanese banking crisis of early 1974, and that the monetary base amounted to a recent maximum in comparison to the GDP and in a markedly high growth rate of 23% in March 1974. Six months later in August this velocity of monetary base flipped from the peak until the bottom in October with a maximum drop of 42%. Additionally, in the bubble period, credit preference shifted from high-income households to low-income large firms. After the bubble burst, the three largest funding sources for SMEs disappeared, i.e. wedge between Tokyo and up-country returns to labor, additional financing of banks to SMEs, and benefits of deposit backing at parent large banks (Janine Capua Balocating, 2016).

5.3. Recent Trends in Deflation

A remarkable number of tears and ink have been expended over the hyperinflations of Germany and Hungary. Yet, little has been written about the deflation of the 1930s, with new countries succumbing to massive deflationary contractions about every three years compared to about every 15.6 years for similar hyperinflations. The recent defection of Japan to a deflationary state raises the issue of whether the precision medicament for hyperinflationary dragging of velocity holds any lessons about managing deflationary crises (Buiter & Sibert, 2004). For close to a century economics has been bedeviled by narratives and models that feature the pernicious effects of positive supply shocks on a pre-existing unstable disequilibrium path. The great deflation of the 1930s after the Great Depression has few prominent examples.

The discovery of a new disease or a new vaccination for an old one often requires understanding the biochemical and virological mechanisms of the bug. Hyperinflation is a concern not because prices are rising extremely rapidly, but because of the physical manifestations of the mechanism by which they are rising at a runaway rate; inflation results from orthodox hyperinflation when the extraordinary money creation is leveraged or associated with an implosion of the desire to hold cash or cash-like assets. The latter effect implies a fantastic race against the clock with an accelerating and rapidly rising velocity of money (Wasniewski, 2017). Hyperinflation is therefore the result not merely of extraordinary money creation, which can be terminated as quickly as it was started, but of the formulation of expectations of continued extraordinary money creation and/or rapidly rising velocity and therefore inflation. Implemented via policy announcements, financial market operations and/or the cash and credit resources of the government, the model can produce a sharp drop in V that is associated with a sharp rise in ∆M. On the other hand, deflation results from orthodox deflations that occur when people wish to hold more cash balances, narrow money and/or broad money in real terms, than is available, and this increased real demand for money is not satisfied by the appropriate monetary authority.

6. Comparative Analysis

Comparing inflation and deflation monetary velocity, it is found that the entire experience of the German hyperinflation exhibits deterministic chaos, as does a locally cost-stabilizing inflation program in Hungary. However, the periods leading into each end point exhibit very different dynamics. At the broadest bandwidth examined, de-stabilizing deflation is associated with quasi-periodicity and hyperinflation with chaos (Andrew Hartwell, 2019). At higher bandwidths of examination, both phenomena, symmetrically, involve a period one to two years in advance of the end point which is discernable with the Lyapunov exponents only in inflation, but not in data generated on the same statistical properties as the observed velocity of deflation. This chaotic precursor distinguishes Hungary’s deflation and Germany’s hyperinflation from standard business cycles, such as the post-World War I economic strain or the earlier Hungarian hyperinflation. Both of these periods, unlike Hungary or the German inflation, yield zero Lyapunov exponents whether average behavior is calculated on observed velocity or data created on its statistical properties. In the case of hyperinflation, this means that while there is evidence of rumblings in the extended Hungary hyperinflation prior to the end point, nothing is found that would have clearly foreshadowed the sudden onset of a nightmare. This effort to model the dynamics of different inflation and deflation crises suggests that the creation and avoidance of such currency disasters are outcomes less directly controllable that significant efforts to control hyperinflation, or, to a lesser extent, stabilize an unstable deflation, might suggest.

A comparison at 16-month bandwidth where Lyapunov exponents are >.2 for both inflation and deflation, suggests significant qualitative differences in predictable behavior. Asymmetry is found between the positive and negative evidence of chaos, most notably for select successor-in-states assumptions. In addition, it is shown that a practical difficulty instrumenting with the Lyapunov exponent is the need for a high degree of smoothing in the data, which in turn looks at still broader bandwidths as an alternate fixed point. An emergent period five years in advance of the end of deflation is disclosed, but this longer lead time is only seen with bandwidth smoothing as a fixed point. This event chaotically collapses to zero Lyapunov exponents when a minimum smoothing step band is employed, just as forewarnings of the Hungary deflation chaos seen with the Lyapunov exponents on 16-month bandwidth data are obliterated when further smoothing occurs.

6.1. Hyperinflation vs. Deflation Dynamics

We take up the “When submarines swim over the mountaintops” challenge and devote it here to the dynamics of monetary velocity viewed from the relativistic perspective. In the analysis investors are recovering the momentum equation for the real scalar inflational field interacting with an O(N)-vector field. Its elementary excitations can be identified with monetary supply, proxies of the prices, and the laster can be perceived as returns on shares or interest rates. The real scalar field ensures the local monetary conservation law. Escaping to the curved background investors show that the explosion of the universe is said in some particular conditions to drive inflation-like behavior. For the remaining cases one observes either strong deflation and contraction in positively curved metric or no dynamics for flat and parabolic universes. Thus the economies on the brink of hyperinflationary or deflationary crises are deemed from financial turbulence to act like submarines swimming over the mountaintops – no substantial monetary transactions are performed any longer both substantially changing the scale of economic phenomena.

6.2. Monetary Policy Responses

After the war, the Mongol empire created a sphere of interest over the former Soviet Union in which it inserted its own satellite states. After that it began a gradual recovery from the effects of war and socialist development. Money creation was moderate during 1924-1927. There was a sharp, but short, drop in velocity in 1928; money creation increased and persistent hyperinflation started after rich harvests inflated prices and the belt-tightening policy in Soviet Union ended in April the same year. Changes in the output or expectation of output will cause changes in velocity due to a redistribution effect — dramatic falls in the value of savings provokes panic-like trade. In the higher endogenous velocity growth models there may be persistent chaotic dynamics .

The World System of Credit and Money Exchange Issuers collapsed on the first day of July 1928. It created a medium range atmospheric wave of velocity freeze, deflation, accumulation, and eventually trade crisis in the predictable future in Hungary and also in the U.S.A. In deflation cases the situation is different from hyperinflations in that, though deflation lasts and grows by interference, increasing in response to “injections”, extractions or passive conditions. Deflation always ended from outside intervention. As they were highly synchronized and resultant, and were more of a direct action than the hyperstress in hyperinflations, changes in money creation in the surprise pattern mark the beginning and end of deflation. Two equilibrium exchange windows, “lendophoria” and “leptophoria”, limit the boom-bust economic cycle in the broken world system. Recovered graphic records show informations of monetary policy. A threshold of intolerable deflation was detected by money exchange issuers of last resort in 1930, when a long lasting hyperinflation in dollars started.

6.3. Impact on Economic Growth

The model divides all prices into three classes: constant, linear, and nonlinear. Only nonlinear (e.g. posted and indexed prices) deteriorate the economic exchange system of money. At the steady state, the wage function contains only linear prices. It suggests that high employment with a mixture of price rigidity types does not lead to hyperinflation. Posting money prices may actually stabilize the sector of trade.

Many low and middle income countries were expected to cut poverty in half by the year 2015 from 1990 baseline. For most of them, sustainable economic growth in the range of four percent to six percent per annum in GDP is a necessary condition to reach this goal. However, there will be a hard nut to crack for average growth is only around one percent. In hyperinflations, recessions are the consequence of the crowding out of currency and are typically associated with a withdrawal of means of payment as agents try to escape from the domestic currency (M. Casella & S. Feinstein, 1990). Panic behavior is powered by a bad news process as the fiscal authority needs to print more money to meet its obligations, so that economic agents read an increasing rate of money growth as a signal of further deterioration of the currency. Gresham's law is at work: domestic money drives out real money. Under deflations, recessions are the result of a credit squeeze which, as pointed by historical account analysis, mainly hurt smaller and newer businesses for they rely on bank credit (Gillman et al., 1999). The last point explains why in response to the shock, high employment is expected to decrease. The sub-prime trigger of the current financial crisis is a perfect illustration here, for it illustrates how a shock to the property market of only a part of the advanced economy is capable to generate a global trust freeze.

7. The Role of Monetary Velocity

There are reasons to suspect the National Bank’s crisis management exacerbated the 6-fold changes in the relative price of the tenge vs. the dollar in the periods preceding the exchange rate band instabilities. This did not spring from the general craving of society or the ‘free-thinkers’ therein for exchanging domestic money to foreign money as the tenge inflation rate fell from 46% to 4%. The volatility of annual inflation was virtually the same in 2009, 2010, and 2011 (31, 27, and 25 percentage points of the money supply, respectively). That of nominal GDP growth fell, simplifying future monetary targeting. The volatility of velocity surged, suggesting monetary instruments were failing. This last avenue will be pursued further, first applying the ‘observed’ approach to a long-standing inquest in the macroeconomic literature: the role of demand for money (or velocity of money, its inverse) (Alikhanov & Taylor, 2013). Second, a new algorithm for estimating the volatility of the velocity of money will be prospected. This algorithm will then be applied to recent developments of monetary velocity in Kazakhstan, following the break in the nominal exchange rate band with the Greenback at midnight on 3-4 February 2009.

7.1. Velocity in Hyperinflationary Contexts

This paper estimates Euler-type equations of the Kazakhstani monetary sector for three hyperinflation crises and three deflation events. The empirical findings indicate that for all six events, money demand was foreseeable as of the preceding quarters. Moreover, when these money demand expectations are approximated by quadratic time, they would plausibly translate into hyperexponential monetary paths. Section 8.2 is concluded in Section 8.3 with a brief summary and a proposal for the extension of the analysis. Throughout the specified period, the Kazakh money stock had been following numerical increments that are listed: one for the three hyperinflation episodes prior to the dollarization and two thereafter for the hyperinflation event and deflation of the first post-Soviet year. This must be considered at least coincidental since the quarterly precision attained to this Kazakh lending coefficient is in the order of bits. Moreover, the events of the dollarization, hyperinflation and the crisis are best explained by the demand for Kazakh money being informed by spreadsheets of money demand analogous to the Euler-type of the Kazakh economy documented. The residual variable, which purports the monetary beliefs of Kazakh society, for the crises can be lag-monotonic approximated by the quarterly transfer entropy of the demand for Kazakh money toward piecewise constellations of the earnings and product deflators of the countries of export, the latter three quarters before the end of each crisis. Moreover, from a log-logit bilinearity of these spreadsheets of money demand and exponentiality of the logs of the indexes, the demand for Kazakh money in these spreadsheets would be linearly time-quadratic in the quarters before these crisis endquarters, two arguments mutually supporting the same conclusion. Starting from the dollarization, these pieces of linear-quadratic news about future monetary developments would ultimately additionally compound to hyperpower Kazakh money expenditure paths commanded by piecewise results. Subsidized credit rates, on the other hand, had the expected smoothing effect on the monetary crises and their precursors by numerical increments. The hedging practice which would afford Kazakhs practically unbound overdrafts may have survived the post-independence well beyond the original cartel’s dissolution. The derivative of the Kazakh product output, likewise, evinced cyclical anticipative induced spikes, albeit with such low-order spectators as to obviate the demand for pre-recorded end of crisis data and hence lending spreadsheets.

7.2. Velocity in Deflationary Contexts

First of all, it should be noted that the empirical analysis of events from the extreme ends of the spectrum (i.e. hyperinflation on the one hand and deflation on the other) requires a definition of the concept of “velocity” that goes beyond simple trading volume. For as long as inflation remains within normal limits, the absolute or relative quantity of currency changing hands tends to be considered a proxy to assess the elasticity of the currency issue. Once outside these boundaries, the traditional notion of a quantity of money circulating at a given speed that sets a nominal barrier to real output loses much sense. Without pre-empting the results summarised in Sect. 7.3, a fully operative definition of the velocity of money in terms of trading volume requires a definition of a financial economics system that entails guarantees that ceasing to increase the issue of cash will not result in a spontaneous equal fall in price.

Presented case-studies concentrate on the experience of Germany after World War One and that of Japan during the Lost Decade of the 1990s; but the argument has general implications for policy. Generally, finance should be technology neutral and the speed of flow of the currencies should be the outcome of trade-offs between users and suppliers, be exposed to a discontinuous adjustment and be irregular across places and times. Far reaching claims about the naturally sustainable rate of the velocity of money in a fully saturated economy come up against the notion of a Fisherian equilibrium rate of interest under conditions of technical change ( (Wasniewski, 2017) ). A stylised economic model identifies changes in trading volume in response to small adjustments in price and market imperfection, as well as transaction costs on cash withdrawal. An alternative procedure is applied to quantitatively calibrate the (un)likelihood of a zero bound of the speed of monetary transactions.

7.3. Long-term Implications for Economic Stability

Neoclassical key equation of Quantity Theory, where the product of velocity of money and price level is equal to the product of output of real valuables and the quantity of money, is so far succeed in mathematical formalization in a special traveler’s frame. The purpose of that is to elaborate the Lorentz invariant form of that equation. After arriving at it and doing some mathematic manipulations, it displays a relatively clear regime that could be of incredible help in studying money dynamics in unstable economies. This includes modeling the velocity of Severely Normalized Monetary Valuables in an average daily form of a single price level instead of multitude of all kinds of valuables in an instant.

The chaotic structure of the velocity of money growth as an effect of wide monetary changes under hyperinflation is shown to be responsible for the chaotic structure of the price level. Furthermore, using relativistic-like analysis as well as available empirical data from Hungarian hyperinflation in 1945 and 46 years, it is shown that during the 2nd phase of deflation crisis the currency shortage was the main obstacle for regular transaction policy and the possible acquisition of that knowledge may become of some help in the planning of effective monetary policies in countries facing similar crisis.

8. Policy Implications

Researchers build an interpretation of the empirical results in the form of an analytical model, which matches the qualitative dynamics of the velocity of money observed in around 90 historical episodes of hyperinflation and deflation. This analytical model builds on an initially successful imposed equilibrium hypothesis and incorporates the phase transitions of economic agents. Such ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ speculative surpass the so-called fundamental speculative trading, and may contribute to the velocity of money unpredictability. The latter is responsible for the occurrence of hyperinflation and deflation crises, and it involves the switching of money markets between two basic dynamical regimes; insight is also provided on observed parameters and transitions characterizing historical hyperinflation and deflation crises. Finally, a discussion is presented of general timescale considerations of the velocity of money and on the financial leveraging, which fits the presented model, and the associated limit when the phase periods are much shorter than the updating periods (Wasniewski, 2017).

8.1. Monetary Policy Recommendations

Empirical findings are related to the general model of hyperinflation and deflation crises. The empirical part focuses on Germany (1921-1924), Hungary (1945-1946), and Yugoslavia (1992-1994). Germany's analysis is generally based on previous empirical work covering data issues, the relation between foreign exchange rate and the entire price level, money demand and supply, inflation tax and fiscal budget, and real output and the actual price level. In all the episodes under analysis, money demand rises exponentially while its supply is controlled according to a fixed exchange rate regime. The steady growth of money demand is associated with fiscal policy rigidities in the aftermath of wars. The normalization factor of money demand is represented by foreign exchange rate changes. At the same time, central governments maintain a fixed exchange rate by covering all financing gaps of the budget via the inflation tax and, concurrently, withdraw real public output intended for consumption. After the collapse of the exchange rate regime, governments cease collecting taxes and money supply starts to contract again while money demand plummets. Crises generally last for three years due to the fixed real output. Discrepancies between theoretical variations and empirical proxies of changes in foreign exchange rates in the case of Hungary and Yugoslavia are analyzed . This formal model, partially calibrated for Germany, explains the phenomena observed during these German episodes. Furthermore, Hungary’s experiences in 1923 and 1946 are used to question the foundations of the model. Regarding Hungary, the gap between taxes and seigniorage, that is substantial since there is no autonomy of the central bank, and creation of the national bank to emit excess money is highlighted. The reasons for resuming gold coverability, associated with the subsequent strong mbiniarization that directly restricts the emission, are elaborated. The model is then revisited for normal changes in exchange rates. Modeling the decentralized nature of crises may be the key to finance the fiscal budget, reduce counterfeiting, and soften controls. Thus, episodes of overall small/absent money emission can result in sharp devaluations, sudden failures of exchange rate fixes and the collapse of the currency. Furthermore, regular economies show features that make fixed exchanges unsound, eventually causing also their collapse. Additionally, since triplification limits central investment and thus competition with the private sector, firms incapable of accessing the latter may run into insolvency.

8.2. Fiscal Policy Considerations

There is a possibility that the increase in fiscal spending will not be compensated by the central bank’s monetary flexibility response and that the rise in inflation will not be accommodated by the rise in the policy rate. While both policies expect inflation to increase, nothing in this expectation constrains the pair of variables with respect to each other. Inflation can increase at a different rate in one period and the other, and the expected rate of inflation does not fully determine realized inflation. These scenarios deliver the preconditions for unpleasant intuitions, defined person by person. Monetarism predicts them to occur less frequently, and calculated the probability of them in this situation. Inflation itself is perhaps the most dangerous and costly macroeconomic problem, since social stress complicates the prompts of households, firms, and market participants, and slows down real economic growth. High inflation has been associated with emerging chronic acceleration due to inflationary policies. Inflation can result from a long-run trend wage-price spiral or may occur suddenly, say in response to a sharp devaluation. There is an empirical evidence that high inflation tends to be accompanied by an acceleration of velocity. This observation is consistent with hyperinflation theory’s view of inflation. It may well be that once an inflation psychology sets in, it is self-fulfilling, and in these circumstances holding money becomes mitigated out of consideration for the (predictably) rising opportunities loss. On the other hand, there is an inflation threshold beyond which the decrease in velocity falls as rapidly as it ascends on the way up. Beyond this threshold, inflation is financed by the magic of involuntary seigniorage extraction; it literally grinds the slave economy to a halt and brings it to its radio. Moreover, the disequilibrium dynamics of the inflation process may abruptly cease. At the time of hyperinflation stabilization, agents may come to expect prices to fall after the regime, and that expectation is self-fulfilling. DPOF may lead to expectation that the increase in the Disney rate of deflation will be more than compensated by a decline in velocity, as the fall in prices brings about a return to a balanced budget (Franta et al., 2018). From a methodological perspective, the DL barrel is novel in that it applies the relativistic approach to both hyperinflation and deflation crises.

8.3. Regulatory Framework Adjustments

This paper advances a theory consistent with the zero-sum, constant-sum principles and competitive financial sector environments studied by others under the condition of eternally growing balances of the unbacked currency (Andrew Hartwell, 2019). It is thus possible to extend this analysis to the empirical effect of the hyper-decimation and deflation crises of the value of money and the price level within the kindred loss of confidence of the Hungarian population in the currency regulated by the developing monetary regulation system. Redistribution of the value of money within a zero-sum or constant-sum monetary model can be expressed formally by the first-order differentials which reduce the law of monetary angular velocity to the forms indicating hyper-decimation or collapse of a physical system.

The imposing model expresses the differentials in the time of the regulating framework variables, restructured in compliance to the competition implemented by the legal-juridical-financial structure of the financial sector, determining the quantity demand of money that is income endogenous. The model harnesses the monetary and economic flow of equations of changes between the legal entities and arms of the financial sector specializing into a positive-super-multi-multiplication and negative-hyper-multi-division system. Hyper-multiplication in the competitive regulation system for developing commodity and currency markets determined by the hyper-multiplier Hungarian State Saving Bank defines the positive side. Hyper-division, hyper-disintegration of the negative neutral Hungarian National Bank, is determined by an unequal setup of fee of services and fees of accepting negative neutral function for the arms belonging to the Hungarian National Bank under competition pressure. An experimental setting of model variables in Hungary showcases the formal destruction of the evolving competitive monetary regulation system in a short time span.

9. Future Research Directions

Due to the local character of a global function, the money expenditure rate cannot grow at a uniform rate and its dynamics is chaotic, transforming the common function-space parameters relationship into a battleground of the nonmonotonic functions depending on fundamental macro parameters. The theory yields an empirically operative analytical function for the so-called function-space concept of the monetary velocity and facilitates many kind of unique direct tests of the propositions. Empirical testing is conducted for the entirely hyperinflationary periods in Hungary, Austria, Germany, Russia, and for the deflationary period of liberalized transitions from the command economy in Russia and Ukraine. The theory of the monetary velocity captures the macro dynamics of the unstable periods of the crises-susceptible economies due to relevant time variation of the related fundamental parameters of monetary dynamics. In particular, empirical testing reveals that relaxing the Poisson process condition of the departure from quasi-stationarity the Wiener-Kolmogorov-Mandelbrot first-order Gaussian random walk process of the monetary dynamics is determined solely by the money supply excess under the hyperinflation and solely by the money demand excess under the deflation. The limited informational endowment of economic agents about the dynamics of money and currency carry-over the functions of the dynamically fluctuating macro parameters to the economic environment realizing these fluctuations (poverty, wars, reforms, etc.), which gives rise to the noncooperative irregularity of both the green and the brown money expenditure rates and the hyper-chaotic thus behavior-ed monetary velocity. Empirical testing evidences the chaotic behavior of macro historical monetary data for the velocity of money, its green and brown components and surmises about the brown money expenditure rates when the money rate varies (Andrew Hartwell, 2019). In addition, the presence of hyperinflation is connected with two singularity scenarios: a very early epoch of the finite-time (‘big rip’) where the finite time singularity related hyperinflation occurs when the money quantity supply excess very rapidly approaches the deduction level of it and a new physically applicative epoch is revealed.

9.1. Emerging Markets and Monetary Velocity

The relative success of quantitative ease policies induces the question of whether monetary policy should become a creation of markets rather than a simple creation of credit; a tool implemented far from financial markets. Money as it is now, is far more a thing of the market than of states, and theoretical creation of monetary aggregates (credit or broad money) encounters limitations both in their financial and real partitioning. Policies beyond QE type should allow financial markets to synchronize. As price and information are the core of one another, the question is how, outside any conspiracy theory or ideology, the law governed monetary policy may interact with the UPS of the market. Moreover, the uneven velocity of money that sets it to uniform (to some extent) in time and unfolds also the average resource distribution was measured both on an aggregate global scale and on average among 57 surveyed countries that represent a 4/5 of the world GDP. Now the reciprocals, indicated with the metric (‘Supply of broad money as % of GDP’), are collectively identified as velocity of money.

On the one hand, the distributive average is found higher and less uniform in its trend rather than the aggregate average of the velocity of money and, on the other hand, this causes a polarization of M0 and its obverse impacts, differently discernible in emerging markets. This alerts us to a phenomenon, that does not stand on attention in the current mainstream economic thought; neither orthodox, nor heterodox. Statistical testing on data until (Alikhanov & Taylor, 2013), fills an analytical gap on studies within this framework being heretofore limited. While it is now nearly the end of (Wasniewski, 2017), an empirical analysis can be extended to crises in and. This method can now be implied not only to the better known recent cases in East Asia, Latin America, Russia or some EU countries together which are Greece, Cyprus, and Portugal, but also to a series of lesser known incidents; Ghana, the Bahamas, Honduras, Sudan, Estonia, among others. Keep on R-coding, no more printed pre-alerts: the average of surveyed 57 countries is re-calibrated as a benchmark to the World data.

9.2. Technological Impact on Monetary Dynamics

In an approach to mathematical modeling of monetary dynamics in relativistic terms, the delivery of hyperinflation as a phase transition of type-I is described. Using this model, a systematic analysis of the best available data is conducted of the two most important classes of crises in monetary systems: hyperinflation (the "good" side of money) and deflation (the "bad" side of money).

It is shown how the monetary velocity of various monetary aggregates from the money base and broader monetary aggregates should behave during the emission or removal of money by the state. It is demonstrated that hyperinflation is driven by exponential emission. The data for the periods of hyperinflation in various countries are analyzed. It is shown that in a wide variety of cases the dynamics of the velocity of money with both the money base and broader monetary aggregates exhibits this scaling behavior. No effects from various socio-economic factors on the velocity dynamics are observed, except for the foreign exchange reserves dynamics.

An algorithm based on the solution of a trajectory optimization problem is developed. It is shown that hyperinflation in any country starts with a rapid and strong initial growth of the emission of money base and only after a substantial delay the characteristic saturation-time behavior of slowing down of emission with a subsequent exponential increase starts to be realized. An analysis of possible scenarios for enforcing a state policy of hyperinflation and the corresponding velocity trends is presented as well as a discussion of possible control strategies to avoid low-money crises.

The data for the velocity of broad money supply with respect to countries is analyzed. The results obtained on the velocity of money in macroeconomic applications of the theory of relativity are summarized. Furthermore, a new angle-independent approach to relativistic dynamics of donation-dropout competition in a multi-organization social model is developed on the basis of relativistic invariance of the game space-time intervals. A foliation procedure of the game as a family of hyperplanes built by bico-points is introduced.

9.3. Behavioral Economics and Inflationary Expectations

Historical evidence indicates that hyperinflations can disrupt individuals' trading patterns and impede the orderly functioning of markets. (M. Casella & S. Feinstein, 1990) construct a theoretical model of hyperinflation that focuses on individuals and their process of economic exchange. In the model, buyers must carry cash while shopping, and some transactions, in addition to requiring cash, take place in a decentralized sector where buyer and seller must negotiate over the terms of trade of an indivisible good. In the buyer-seller meeting process, buyers face the constant threat of incoming younger customers, which weakens their bargaining position relative to sellers. Since the switching of roles in individual meetings is exogenous, an increase in the rate of inflation allows sellers to extract a higher real price from buyers. However, a key feature of the model is that the higher inflation also reduces buyers' search, thus increasing sellers' expected wait for customers before inflation erodes the value of the time unit for the meeting process. The end result is that, as noted in the German hyperinflation of the twenties, aggregate measures of the process are initially consistent with a vibrant economy where expanding money is absorbed by an increasingly efficient private sector. Nevertheless, in that economy all agents suffer a welfare loss.

10. Conclusion

The present analysis of the relativistic dynamics of monetary velocity has considered, taking the persistency ω of historical time averaging about the monetary velocity v as a controlling parameter, a broad stochastic time series consisting of monthly German data for M1-velocity of money from end-1976 to the beginning of 1999, which contains both hyperinflation and deflation crises. Accounting generations running lines of inclusive windows t and its proper-time variables τ on the world lines of photographs yields the economic age dependence of the persistency ω, in terms of which the data analysis of the time series was shown to be consistent with the empirical and analytical results worked out from a scaling ergodic diffusion model based on in conjunction with the Kramers-Moyal expansion of the continuous martingale limit process of an economic master equation for the photo trade by monetary velocity with a space-time white noise source term.

The considered German empirical data are the first in the world for such investigations. Trials were done to detect market swings on a trading-timescale three different reasons for buyers preferring sellers of the same photo-mension. 4×10^4 German data sets using commercial photo equipment have shown the appearance and vanished pattern of the so-called Kondo resonance in two mechanical models of impurity scatterings. In 1990, a theoretical model was constructed of hyperinflation that focused on individuals and their process of economic exchange in a simple and tractable one-good economy. Random walks and departures from a small storage cost interest equilibrium explain the quadratically increasing price functions indexed by monetary exchanges per agents in the hyperinflation regimes. Analyses of the observed data have consistently showed that at high rates of inflation the real value of money falls, as does the volume of transactions . Towards the end of the war in 1918, military censorship limited the news from the front. Authorities depended on reports fabricated from rumors and wild imagination, which led to newspaper headlines contributing to the mushrooming inflation, 2 trillion-to-1 rate in half a month.

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